Canadian intelligence officials have warned Prime Minister Justin Trudeau that China has allegedly been targeting Canada with a vast campaign of foreign interference, which includes funding a clandestine network of at least 11 federal candidates running in the 2019 election, according to Global News sources.
Delivered to the prime minister and several cabinet members in a series of briefings and memos first presented in January, the allegations included other detailed examples of Beijing’s efforts to further its influence and, in turn, subvert Canada’s democratic process, sources said.
Based on recent information from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), those efforts allegedly involve payments through intermediaries to candidates affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), placing agents into the offices of MPs in order to influence policy, seeking to co-opt and corrupt former Canadian officials to gain leverage in Ottawa, and mounting aggressive campaigns to punish Canadian politicians whom the People’s Republic of China (PRC) views as threats to its interests.
CSIS told Global News it could not answer some questions for this story. But the service confirmed it has identified the PRC’s foreign interference in Canada, which can include covert funding to influence election outcomes.
“The Chinese Communist Party … is using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty,” CSIS stated.
The briefings did not identify the 2019 candidates. But the alleged election interference network included members from both the Liberal and Conservative parties, according to sources with knowledge of the briefs.
Global News was not able to confirm from the sources which cabinet ministers may have been privy to the briefs nor the specific timing that the information was reportedly shared.
2:21Canada ‘creating new tools’ to protect institutions against China, others seeking to influence elections
Chief among the allegations is that CSIS reported that China’s Toronto consulate directed a large clandestine transfer of funds to a network of at least eleven federal election candidates and numerous Beijing operatives who worked as their campaign staffers.
ADVERTISEMENT
The funds were allegedly transferred through an Ontario provincial MPP and a federal election candidate staffer. Separate sources aware of the situation said a CCP proxy group, acting as an intermediary, transferred around $250,000.
The 2022 briefs said that some, but not all, members of the alleged network are witting affiliates of the Chinese Communist Party. The intelligence did not conclude whether CSIS believes the network successfully influenced the October 2019 election results, sources say.
CSIS can capture its findings through warrants that allow electronic interception of communications among Chinese consulate officials and Canadian politicians and staffers.
Sources close to this situation say they are revealing details from the 2022 briefs to give Canadians a clearer understanding of China’s attacks on Canada’s democratic system. Out of fear of retribution, they have asked their names be withheld.
In response to the briefing details, experts say the alleged interference points to weakness in Canada’s outdated espionage and counterintelligence laws, which sophisticated interference networks run by China, Russia and Iran are exploiting.
Still, the 2022 intelligence asserts that China conducts more foreign interference than any other nation, and interference threats to Canada increased in 2015 when Chinese president Xi Jinping elevated the CCP’s so-called United Front influence networks abroad.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) did not directly answer a series of questions from Global News, including whether or not Prime Minister Trudeau was briefed in 2022 on Canadian intelligence that alleged China had covertly funded a clandestine network of candidates in the 2019 election.
It also did not respond to a question on the need for tighter federal rules against foreign influence on Canadian politics.
“Protecting Canadians’ security is our top priority. Threats, harassment, or intimidation of Canadian citizens are unacceptable, and all allegations of interference are investigated thoroughly by our security agencies,” a statement from the PMO said. “As threats evolve, so must the methods used to address them. That is why the Prime Minister has given the Minister of Public Safety the mandate to improve collaboration between Canadian security agencies.”
Conservative Party leadership did not respond to Global News questions by deadline for this story.
0:37China responds to Trudeau, Global News investigation, says it has no interest in ‘Canada’s internal affairs’
“We simply don’t have a prosecutorial end game to deal with foreign interference,” said Dan Stanton, a former CSIS officer who studies Chinese interference, but isn’t privy to recent CSIS reporting. “The sophistication of the threat: it is not the guy with the fedora and black coat, like the old days with the KGB. The whole point of influence networks is that anyone can be used by a foreign state as a co-optee, or agent, or source.”
Stanton and other experts told Global News that CSIS benefits from modernized counter-terror laws that have enabled the service to mitigate terror planning and funding networks since 9/11, but Canada’s espionage laws are stuck in the Cold War era.
“So, until we make legislative changes on interference,” Stanton said, “it’s just CSIS telling our politicians, ‘Hey, be careful out there.'”
In April 2021, a private members bill in the House of Commons called for a foreign influence registry, but it did not become law.
Kenny Chiu, the B.C. Conservative MP who wrote the bill, was subsequently targeted by the CCP’s election interference network, sources said. Chiu says his law would have compelled anyone working for hostile regimes, such as Russia and Iran and China, to declare their interests, and this transparency would protect Canada’s democracy.
The Toronto Consulate and Chinese officials in Ottawa did not respond to questions from Global News about allegations in the 2022 briefs.
Money and influence
Interference on Canadian soil is orchestrated by the CCP’s powerful United Front Work Department, which mobilizes large sections of society abroad to fulfill Chinese Communist Party objectives, according to the 2022 briefs.
United Front operations can include politicians, media, business, student and community groups, and are aimed at consolidating support for CCP policy as well as targeting critics and the causes of ethnic groups seen as “poisons” by the CCP, such as Uyghurs and Tibetans.
Several federal candidates from Canada’s 2019 federal election met with China-based United Front Work Department officials, the intelligence alleges, but did not identify the politicians.


https://www.wecpaca.ca/forum/cpaca-forum/you-guan-2019-nian-lian-bang-da-xuan
2022年11月7日報道:今天,《環球新聞》Globe News 發表一篇調查報道,題目是:Canadian intelligence warned PM Trudeau that China covertly funded 2019 election candidates: Sources,《加拿大情報機構警告特魯多總理中國賄助2019年聯邦大選候選人》。 最近在聯邦政府注冊的910 CLUB向CPACA提供了該篇報道的編譯文章。CPACA平臺感謝910 CLUB的信任和使用。910 CLUB是倡導普世理念和加拿大憲法權益的非盈利機構。 CSIS警告總理特魯多,中國暗中資助 2019 年大選候選人 CSIS 報告稱,中國駐多倫多領事館指示 向一個由至少 11 名聯邦候選人和眾多擔任助選工作的人員的 北京特工組成的網絡秘密轉移大量資金。 據稱,這些資金是通過安大略省某位省議員以及一位助選聯邦候選人的工作人員轉移的。 了解情況的獨立消息人士稱,作為中間人的中共代理集團轉移了約 25 萬美元。 根據《環球新聞》的消息人士說,加拿大情報官員警告總理賈斯汀·特魯多,有證據證明中國一直在針對加拿大進行大規模的外國干預活動,其中包括資助一個由至少 11 名 2019 年聯邦大選的候選人所組成的秘密網絡。 消息人士稱,在 今年1 月份首次提交給總理和幾位內閣成員的一系列簡報和備忘錄中,這些指控還包括北京努力擴大其影響力並且顛覆加拿大民主進程的其他詳細例子。 根據加拿大安全情報局 (CSIS) 的最新信息,這些努力據稱涉及通過中間人向與中共 (CCP) 有關聯的候選人付款,並將代理人安插在國會議員辦公室以影響政策,物色同夥和行賄前加拿大官員以得逞在渥太華獲得影響力,並發起攻汙行動以懲罰被中共認為對其利益構成威脅的加拿大政治人士。 CSIS 回答征詢時,告訴《環球新聞》,它無法回答這個説法中的有些問題。但CSIS確認,它已經確實認定中共對加拿大的外國干涉,其中可能包括秘密資助以影響選舉結果。 該系列簡報沒有明白指出哪些 2019 年的候選人。但據了解該份系列簡報的消息人士稱,這個所謂的干涉選舉網絡包括自由黨和保守黨等兩方面的候選人。 其中最主要的指控是,CSIS 報告稱,中國駐多倫多領事館指示向一個由至少 11 名聯邦候選人和眾多擔任助選工作的人員的北京特工組成的網絡秘密轉移大量資金。 據稱,這些資金是通過安大略省某位省議員以及一位助選聯邦候選人的工作人員轉移的。了解情況的獨立消息人士稱,作為中間人的中共代理集團轉移了約 25 萬美元。 2022 年的簡報稱,所謂的網絡中的一些(但不是全部)成員正在與中共的附屬機構發生關係。消息人士稱,情報並未得出 結論,CSIS 是否榷認該網絡成功地影響了 2019 年 10 月的選舉結果的結論。 CSIS 可以運用法庭准許的電子攔截手段獲取中國領事官員與加拿大政界人士及其屬員之間通訊記錄獲取其調查結果。 接近該消息來源的消息人士稱,他們正在逐步披露從該份2022年系列簡報中獲得的細節,以便讓加拿大民衆更加清楚地了解中共對加拿大民主制度的攻擊。出於對後果的顧慮,這些人士要求不透露他們的姓名。 針對該份系列簡報被透露的細節,專家表示,所謂的干預表明加拿大過時的間諜和反情報法律存在弱點,中國、俄羅斯和伊朗運營的複雜干擾網絡正在利用這些漏洞。 儘管如此,2022 年的簡報仍斷言,中國進行的外國干涉比任何其他國家都多,而 從2015 年以來,中國國家主席習近平提升在海外中共影響的所謂統戰網絡干擾時,對加拿大的干涉威脅尤爲明顯。 “保護加拿大人的安全是我們的首要任務。對加拿大公民的威脅、騷擾或恐嚇是不可接受的,我們的安全機構將對所有的干涉指控進行徹底調查,”總理辦公室PMO 的一份聲明說。 “隨著威脅的演變,應對威脅的方法也必須如此。這就是為什麼總理授權公共安全部長改善加拿大各安全機構之間的協同作業。” 2021 年 4 月,國會的一項個人法案要求建立外國影響力登記處,但並未成為法律。消息人士稱,卑詩省落選的保守黨國會議員趙錦榮起草該項法案;隨後成為中共干預選舉的網絡攻擊目標。趙錦榮說,他的法案若通過將迫使任何受雇為俄羅斯、伊朗和中國等敵對政權工作的人員必須宣布他們的利益。這種透明度將保護加拿大的民主。 關於 2022 年系列簡報中被指控的問題,多倫多中領館和駐渥太華的中國官員沒有回應《環球新聞》徵詢。 金錢和影響力 根據 2022 年的系列簡報,對加拿大主權的干涉是由中共強大的統戰部精心策劃的。該部動員海外社會各層面的人力來實現中共的目標。 中共統戰部部署的人力資源可以包括政治人士、媒體、企業、學生和社區團體,旨在鞏固對中共政策的支持,以及針對批評中共的人士和被中共視為“毒藥”的民族事業,例如維吾爾族和藏族。 CSIS稱,2019 年聯邦大選期間,有幾名候選人會見了中共統戰部官員,但是沒有明確指出這些政治人士的身份。 雖然習近平領導下的中共統戰部本身並不是間諜機構,但是該份系列簡報堅稱中共統戰部在加拿大建立的網絡為中共的間諜機構如國家安全部的干預行動提供了便利。 該份系列簡報還報導說,習近平的中共統戰部通過中國駐加拿大各地使領事館運作,中國官員利用中共在當地的代理人將資金從領事館注入加拿大的政治體系。 CSIS 的系列簡報還指出了 2014 年多倫多教育局與孔子學院合作的爭議。孔子學院是中國備受爭議的國家資助的文化教育項目。據美國國務院稱,許多家長、教師和學生反對這些學校的參與,這些學校由中共統戰部指導。 該份系列簡報指出,多倫多中國領事館涉嫌向身份不明的代理團體轉移了 100 萬美元,這些代理團體組織了抗議活動,以支持該計劃繼續融入多倫多地區學校系統。當多倫多教育局投票切斷與該組織的聯繫時,這一努力最終失敗了。 中共統戰部不只經濟資助,還誘惑拉攏政客和騷擾批評中共的人士。 該份簡報中更引人注目的指控之一是涉及國會2021 年 2 月的關鍵投票,在該投票過程中,國會議員要投票表決支持或拒絕聯合國決議,宣布中國對維吾爾人的待遇為種族滅絕。 該份簡報聲稱,在國會結束該項投票之後,中國情報人員對投票支持該決議的國會議員進行了深入的背景調查。 特工們針對性地研究了具體的國會議員的選區,以獲取在該選區有哪些行業和公司的資情,以及這些公司是否與中國有經濟來往。 消息人士稱,這項行動的目的是判斷中國是否可以離間被視為中共敵人的加拿大政客與當地經濟的關係。 此外,據稱,在 2021 年 9 月的聯邦選舉之前,CSIS接到少數國會議員報告,說他們擔心自己的家人和名譽受到污衊,並認為他們成為中共的目標,損害他們當選的機會。 據稱,中共針對的國會議員之一、趙錦榮議員表示,他相信中國特工成功地在微信和普通話媒體報導中將他抹黑為種族主義者。他在自己選區内,曾提出主張在香港進行透明的選舉,還投票贊成宣布中國在新疆的行為是種族滅絕行爲,並在 2021 年 4 月提交了要求建立外國影響登記處的法案。 “所以在 2021 年大選之前,我受到了華語媒體的疏遠對待。在競選期間,選民將我拒之門外。我收到的信息是,‘趙錦榮是種族主義者。趙錦榮是反亞裔的。’” 中國情報活動領域 2022 年的簡報稱,多倫多中國領事館的一名官員指示 參與2019 年聯邦競選助選人員要控制和監督候選人的會議。這些努力包括阻止與台灣社區的代表會面。台灣是一個民主國家,北京聲稱是一個叛離的省份。 這種干預也延伸到民選官員,根據簡報聲稱,其中提到了將秘密特工安插在民選官員身邊以試圖控制聯邦國會議員的政策選擇的走向。 2022 年的簡報還詳細介紹了中國情報部門為滲透、監視和“擾亂”中國僑民社區所做的努力。 溫哥華的香港加拿大社區領袖 Fenella Sung 說,她長期以來一直認為,中國情報已通過商業誘因和“微妙的心理戰”滲透到加拿大僑民群體中。 她還認為,中共統戰部在BC省和安大略省的一些選區控制並資助了一個“可互換”的候選人和提名網絡。 強迫遣返 2022 年的簡報還揭示了中國所謂的獵狐行動,這是習近平主席打擊腐敗和逼迫經濟逃犯返回中國的一項備受矚目的國際運作。 國家安全專家認為,獵狐行動與其說是打擊腐敗,不如說是中共將鎮壓觸角伸向海外僑民社區,鎮壓其對手和政治異見人士。 2020 年,一名中國警察與一名加拿大警察合作遣返一名經濟逃犯,引起了人們的關注。 2022 年的簡報稱,在另一次強制遣返中,中國警方將獵狐目標的兄弟和父親帶入加拿大,除非經濟逃犯也同意返回,否則不允許他們返回中國。 西班牙人權NGO, SafeGuard Defenders 的一份新近的報告支持了這些懷疑,在全球 50 個類似的用於遣返獵狐目標的地點中,揭露了多倫多有三処涉嫌秘密的中國警察派出所。